The Insurgency in North-East Nigeria: Background
Sixteen years in, the conflict has fractured into competing factions — and the humanitarian caseload is larger than the fighting alone would suggest.
The armed conflict in Nigeria's north-east is usually described in headlines as "Boko Haram". The reality is more fragmented, and the distinctions matter for understanding what is happening on the ground.
This article sets out what is documented in published research. It does not speculate about motives or predict outcomes.
Who is involved
Boko Haram / Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS) — the original movement, which fractured in 2016.
Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) — the faction that split from JAS and aligned with Islamic State. It operates three administrative wilaya inside Borno State: Buhaira, Faruq and Krenowa.
The Bakura faction, operating around Lake Chad.
The two main factions have fought each other as well as the Nigerian state. Competition between them is one of the documented drivers of violence against civilians.
What sustains it
Research identifies a consistent set of factors:
- Weak state presence in rural local government areas, where there is no permanent police, court or administrative capacity
- Competition between the two main factions for territory and legitimacy
- Cross-border sanctuary around Lake Chad, where the Nigeria–Niger–Chad–Cameroon borders meet
- Acquisition of drone and IED capability
- Revenue from taxing farming, fishing and trade routes in areas under effective control
That last point is important and under-discussed. ISWAP in particular has operated as a governing authority in parts of Borno — levying taxes, adjudicating disputes, and providing a form of order. That is a harder problem than pure insurgency, because it competes with the state on the state's own ground.
The documented figures
From the EU Agency for Asylum Country of Origin Information report Nigeria: Security Situation, published January 2026 and covering 1 January 2024 to 31 August 2025:
- Borno State: 3,995 deaths across 813 security incidents
- 1,263 violence-related deaths in 2024 alone, the highest of any Nigerian state — 165.7 deaths per 100,000 residents
- Internally displaced persons in Borno: 1,704,175 as at November 2024
- Returnees: 890,960 as at August 2024
The 2025 resurgence. Between March and May 2025, at least 12 coordinated attacks took place from late April to mid-May. Military bases at Marte were overrun; Dikwa and Rann were taken. By late May 2025, all but one of the 300-plus towns and villages in Marte local government area were outside government control. Suicide bombings resumed after a gap of roughly four years. IED attacks on highways killed at least 35 travellers in April 2025.
Human Rights Watch, covering 2025: at least 57 killed and around 70 missing in Mallam Karamti and Kwatandashi in May 2025; at least 60 killed, including soldiers, at Darul Jamal in September 2025.
The humanitarian picture
From UNICEF's Humanitarian Action for Children appeal for 2026:
- 8.4 million people in need nationally, of whom 5 million are children
- Around 5.9 million people in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe — the BAY states — need urgent assistance
- Over 2.3 million internally displaced and 2.2 million returnees in the BAY states
- More than 3.7 million displaced across priority regions, 70% of them women and children
- 3 million children expected to suffer severe wasting nationwide in 2026
- UNICEF's 2026 requirement: US$210.8 million, 64% of it for nutrition
The nutrition share is the number that tells you most. The dominant humanitarian consequence of this conflict is no longer direct violence — it is malnutrition among displaced children, driven by disrupted farming, restricted movement and overstretched health services.
Why returns are difficult
Almost 900,000 people have returned to areas of Borno, and state policy has encouraged camp closures and resettlement. But returning to a village requires that the village be secure, that farmland be safe to work, and that a clinic and a school exist.
Where any of those are missing, returns are fragile. The 2025 loss of territory in Marte demonstrates how quickly that can reverse.
Frequently asked questions
Is Boko Haram defeated? No. The EUAA data for 2024–2025 documents continued attacks, the overrunning of military positions, and the loss of government control across most of one local government area in 2025.
What is the difference between Boko Haram and ISWAP? ISWAP split from the original movement in 2016 and aligned with Islamic State. They are separate organisations that have fought each other.
How many people are displaced? More than 2.3 million internally displaced in the Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states, with a further 2.2 million recorded as returnees.
Sources
- Casualty, incident, IDP and territorial data — EUAA, Nigeria: Security Situation, Borno chapter
- 2025 attacks on civilians — Human Rights Watch World Report 2026
- Humanitarian caseload and 2026 appeal — UNICEF Humanitarian Action for Children, Nigeria 2026 (PDF)